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Foreword 
One of the important problem in decision analysis relates to the situation, where the 
committee (group of decision makers) has to  select the best alternative from a given, 
finite set. In most cases, the alternatives are evaluated on the basis of several quality fac- 
tors. In the paper, the authors present the concept of decision support systems in the con- 
text of such a decision situation and discuss several issues relating to the computer imple- 
mentation of group decision support systems. The presented approach is based on the 
theory of aspiration-led decision making and the satisfactory principle, which ensures 
proper structuralization of the decision process and allows proper balance of opinion 
between the group members. 
Alexander Kurzhanski 
Chairman 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Decision making is one of the most complicated forms of managers or designers 
activity (since engineering design can be also interpreted in a decision-making context). 
The following elements of the decision making process should be stressed here: 
- successful decisions require obviously rather high level of knowledge about the 
problem being analyzed and, while master experts in a given field can intuitively or holist- 
ically, see Dreyfus (1984), arrive at  the best decisions, there are still many situations in 
which aggregating opinions of a committee and using decision support systems might 
improve the quality of decisions; 
- the effects of possible decisions on their outcomes (called also quality factors, attri- 
butes, objective outcomes) must be implicitly or explicitly predicted by the decision 
maker; this might be a rather difficult task, especially if the quality of the decision can be 
characterized by many attributes or objective outcomes; 
- any decision making process is characterized by a certain level of uncertainty and 
this uncertainty must be taken into account when making decisions; committee decision 
making might represent some of the ways of coping with uncertainty; 
- complex structural and logical relationships might exist between the elements - 
alternative decisions, their attributes or quality criteria - of the decision problem being 
analyzed; 
- a decision making process is in fact an information processing task; therefore the 
decision maker must often handle large quantities of information of various nature and 
usually of poor quality. 
Due to the facts listed above, a decision making process requires certain amount of 
time and resources; except for the cases of expert decision makers making repetitive deci- 
sions, the decisions made might frequently be far from optimal, or even satisfactory. Usu- 
ally, the complexity of a decision making process does not allow to analyze all possible 
options and only a small subset can be effectively analyzed. Because of the lack of a priori 
knowledge and the presence of uncertainty, it can often happen that potentially good deci- 
sions are rejected on a very early stage of the decision process. The informational and log- 
ical aspects of decision making imply that a computer with its ability of handling and 
processing large amounts of information and analyzing complex logical relations could be 
a proper tool to support this activity. 
The concept of a decision support system (DSS) became rather popular during recent 
years. There are many commonly accepted definitions of a decision support system. All 
these definitions agree that  such a system must aid a decision maker in solving unstruc- 
tured (or badly structured, semistructured), complex problems. However, many other 
aspects of these definitions are still unresolved. 
One of such aspects is the relation of this concept to  other fields such as operations 
research (OR) and management science (MS), especially to  management information sys- 
tems (MIS). A deeper discussion of this issue was recently given by Parker and Al-Utabi 
(1986). The authors reviewed about 350 papers related to  this subject while trying t o  find 
the most appropriate characterization of the concept of decision support systems. The fol- 
lowing set of characteristics was defined by the authors: 
A DSS should: 
- assist managers in their decision processes for semistructured tasks, 
- support and enhance rather than replace managerial judgment, 
- improve the effectiveness of decision making rather than the efficiency of decisions, 
- combine the use of models or analytical techniques with traditional da ta  access and 
retrieval functions, 
- focus on features which make them easy t o  use in interactive mode by nonspecial- 
ists in computer science, 
- emphasize flexibility and adaptability to accommodate changes in the environment 
or even in the decision making approach of the user. 
Following the same source, we should consider a characterization of the decision pro- 
cess formulated by Simon (1958). According to  his definition, a decision process consists 
of the following three steps: 
- Intelligence: searching the environment for opportunities calling for a decision, 
- Design: defining the decision situation, inventing, developing and analyzing possi- 
ble courses of action, 
- Choice: selecting a particular course of action from those available. 
When applying the above characterization, it is possible t o  conclude that  manage- 
ment information systems have made major contributions to  the phase of intelligence, 
while management science and operational research have been useful mostly for the phase 
of choice. The design phase could be the field of the primary contributions of decision s u p  
port systems; however, it must be stressed that  for multiobjective and multiactor decision 
situations, the classical approaches of management science and operational research are 
insufficient also for the phase of choice and many decision support systems concentrate on 
this phase for such situations. It should be also pointed out that  the design phase might 
be performed when using a management information system, but it starts then from the 
data  available in the system and moves upwards to  the decision maker. When using a 
decision support system, the design phase starts with the problem to  be solved and and 
works down while the computer selects some appropriate subsets of data and information 
stored in the system and necessary to  find a solution. 
Other aspects of the concept of decision support systems were discussed by Keen and 
Scott-Morton (1978). According to  them, the main area of impact of DSS is related to  
such decision problems, in which ".. there i s  suficient structure for computer and analytic 
aids to be of value, but where managers judgment is  essential". The main payoff to  organi- 
zation caused by application of DSS is " ... eztending the range and capacity of manager's 
decision process to  help them to improve their eflectiveness". Finally, the main relevance 
for managers in decision making process was specified as "creation of supportive tools, 
under their own control, which does not attempt to  automate the decision process, 
predefine objectives or impose solutions". 
The last statement deserves special attention: there exists certainly an area of 
human creativity directed toward automating decisions, such as in automatic control of 
various industrial or other processes. This, however, concerns repetitive decisions that 
must be made speedily and precisely, while they might be either bothering or made in a 
dangerous environment for humans. On the other hand, there is a vast area of decision 
situations in which human insight is indispensable. In such situations, the role of a deci- 
sion support system is to provide support; the human is still the most important element 
of the decision process and the final decision is in his hands. The main purpose of the DSS 
in such situations is to increase the understanding of the decision problem through a sup- 
port in the analysis of possible consequences of decisions to be made; other purposes 
might be a simplification of the access to information and knowledge necessary to find a 
satisfactory solution, as well as a support in filling out the details of a tentative decision 
once the main direction of the decision is specified by the human decision maker. 
Other discussions related to methodological and organizational aspects of DSS were 
also published by Naylor (1982), Watson and Hill (1983), Vazsonyi (1982) and Wynne 
(1982). While similar to the characterizations of DSS presented above, the conclusions 
from these papers can be summarized as follows: 
- Decision support systems allow for the introduction o j  judgment, while traditional 
approaches of operations research or management science are normative or prescriptive; 
- Decision support systems deal with unstructured or semistructured problems, while 
traditional approaches of operation research and management science apply mostly to 
structured problems; 
- Traditional approaches of operations research and management science provide 
usually normative solutions or prescriptive recommendations, while decision support sys- 
tems provide at  most tentative solutions; 
- Unlike traditional approaches of operations research and management science, deci- 
sion support systems do not make an attempt to replace decision makers, but to support 
them; hence DSS is a mind supporting device. 
Another deep analysis of various organizational and methodological aspects of DSS 
was published by Sage (1981). This analysis reviews the concept of DSS from the point of 
view of various disciplines - including psychology, organizational behavior and design, 
information science, management science and computer science. The basis for this investi- 
gation is a critical review of over 400 publications related to decision support systems. 
More recent developments, however, added new issues to the discussions about the 
concept of decision support systems. While the conclusions presented above remain valid, 
both management information systems and operations research (or even mathematical 
programming) have moved quite far into the field of decision support. The bottom up 
move, from management information systems, included the development of logical pro- 
gramming languages that result in the incorporation of data bases with knowledge bases, 
expert systems, other tools of artificial intelligence into decision support. The top down 
move, from mathematical programming and operations research, was based on interactive 
techniques of mathematical programming, multiobjective optimization and game theory 
that can be incorporated into decision support to provide for more powerful tools for 
alternative generation and evaluation and for supporting negotiations in collective deci- 
sion processes. Although these two trends are beginning to meet in the middle thus result- 
ing in new generations of decision support systems, we can still use today the following 
classification of DSS: 
- A) simple tools o j  managerial decision support (that might be used also as building 
blocks of more sophisticated decision support systems) such as modern data bases, elec- 
tronic spreadsheet systems, etc.; 
- B )  logical base decision support systems whose main functions relate to help in 
recognizing logical patterns in a decision situation; these systems might involve the use of 
expert system style programming, knowledge bases, other tools of artificial intelligence; 
- C) alternative generation and evaluation systems whose main functions concentrate 
on the process of choice among various decision alternatives either specified a priori or 
generated with help of the system; such systems might include issues of planning, collec- 
tive decision processes or even negotiations between many decision makers, and more 
advanced systems of this type might involve considerable use of mathematical program- 
ming techniques, such as optimization, game theory, decision theory, dynamic systems 
theory, etc. 
In the last category, the mathematical programming techniques cannot be used as 
devices for proposing normative or prescriptive solutions; they can be only considered as 
tools for simplifying information complexity and for interactively generating tentative 
solutions in response to decision makers requirements. Such interpretation of modern 
mathematical programming techniques is, however, possible due to advances in multiob- 
jective optimization and other techniques that admit multi-valued solutions together with 
some selection principles guided by the decision maker. 
In both categories B) and C), a decision support system includes a model of the deci- 
sion situation which might have various forms - a logical form for the systems of category 
B), but also for some simpler systems of category C), a mathematical programming form 
of various classes - linear, nonlinear, dynamic programming, various classes of game 
theoretical models, etc. More important, perhaps, is the role of the model in the decision 
process. Simple models might just describe the logic of a decision situation, more compli- 
cated models might be directly or indirectly used for alternative generation, some parts of 
models (provided they have not too normative character) might be also useful in alterna- 
tive selection. Some authors - see Van Hee (1986) - require that a decision support system 
worth this name must include a model of the decision situation. While this is an impor- 
tant characterization of DSS, we should stress that the very concept of a model might be 
not sufficiently precise - see Wierzbicki (1984a) - to insist on this requirement; for exam- 
ple, some electronic spreadsheet formulae or even an interpretation of variables in the 
spreadsheet might already define a model of a decision situation. With the reservation 
that the concept of a model might require further specification, we shall concentrate how- 
ever on decision support systems that contain a model of the decision situation. 
There might be many other classifications of decision support systems: 
- systems that concentrate on the selection and choice between a number of discrete 
alternatives versus systems that admit a continuum of alternatives and help to generate 
interesting or favorable alternatives among them; 
- systems that are especially designed to be used by a single user or decision maker, 
versus systems that are designed to help multiple users or decision makers simultaneously; 
- systems that support operational decision making and planning of repetitive type, 
where the role of the system is mostly filling out details for decisions intuitively selected 
by the user, versus systems that support strategic decision making and planning, confront- 
ing essentially novel situations, where the role of the system is mostly supporting learning 
and intuition formation by the user through the generation of various alternatives follow- 
ing general instructions of the user; 
- specialized decision support systems designed to help in a very specific decision 
situation versus adaptable decision support system shells that can be modified and adapted 
to specific cases in a broader class of decision situations; 
- systems that assume (explicitly or implicitly) a specific framework of rationality of 
decisions followed by the user versus systems that try to accommodate a broader class of 
perceptions of rationality. 
The presented taxonomy of possible aspects of Decision Support Systems can be con- 
sidered as tentative and far from being complete. It should be mentioned hovewer, that 
until now a uniform characterization of various aspects of theory and methodology of 
Decision Support Systems does not exist - mostly due to insufficient experimental 
material which could be used as a background for such an analysis. When reviewing the 
existing literature, it is easy to conclude that all these definitions are biased by the 
knowledge, interests and experiences of the researcher developing a particular approach or 
methodology - depending on the fact wheteher this person is a specialist in data bases 
techniques, utility theory, optimization or operations research - see the concept of Deci- 
sion Support Schools by Stabel (1986). An interesting analysis of such biases have been 
presented also by Ginzberg and Stohr (1982). 
2. THE QUASISATISFICING DECISION FRAMEWORK 
Since it might be argued that the designer of a decision support system should not 
impose on potential users his own perception of what is a rational decision, see Wierzbicki 
(1984), an important issue is a sufficiently broad framework for decision making that 
would include many possible perceptions of rationality. Following Dreyfus (1984) we 
should first distinguish between calculative or analytical rationali ty versus deliberative or 
holistic rationali ty.  An expert in decision making in a given field does not need calcula- 
tions of consequences of possible decisions - except in essentially novel situations, where 
he might need analytical support for learning about novel strategic factors. A novice in 
decision making in a field must use calculations until he becomes an expert. In either case, 
decision support systems are useful for supporting the learning by the decision maker, not 
for replacing the decision maker in actual decisions. The reasoning and experimental evi- 
dence given by Dreyfus explain best why we stress the word support when speaking about 
DSS. 
Even if we necessarily apply logical or calculative means when constructing a deci- 
sion support system, we should not try to  impose a specific understanding of calculative 
rationality on the user. There are several frameworks for analytical rationality; we can 
represent them best when assuming a certain mathematical structure of the decision 
situation. Such a structure might consist of: 
- a space of decisions (alternatives, options, controls, designs etc.) denoted by E,; if 
this space is a discrete set, we speak about discrete alternatives, 
- a constraint set of admissible decisions Xoc  E,, 
- a space of outcomes (attributes, objective outcomes, objectives, performance 
indices, etc.) denoted by Ey, 
- an outcome mapping f : E, + Ey, which also defines the set of attainable outcomes 
Yo = f(zo) c Ey; this mapping might be given explicitly by a substantive model of the 
decision si tuation or be supplied judgmentally by experts evaluating alternatives along 
various attributes, in which case we have judgmental model evaluation, 
- a partial preordering in the space of outcomes that is usually implied by the deci- 
sion problem and usually has some obvious interpretation, such as maximization of profit 
competing with the maximization of market share, etc.; a standard assumption is that 
this preordering is transit ive and can be expressed by a positive cone D c E,. 
- a complete preordering in the space of outcomes or, a t  least, in the set of attainable 
outcomes, which is usually not given in any precise mathematical form, but is contained 
in the mind of the decision maker, such as how actually the preferences between the max- 
imization of profit and the maximization of market share should be distributed in the 
above example. 
The main differences between various frameworks of rationality that lead to diverse 
approaches to interactive decision support are concerned with the assumptions about this 
complete preordering and the way of its utilization in the DSS. This issue is also closely 
related with the way in which the DSS interacts with the decision maker; some variants 
of DSS require that the user answers enough questions for an adequate estimation of this 
complete preordering, some other variants need only general assumptions about the 
preordering, still other variants admit a broad interpretation of this preordering and 
diverse frameworks of rationality that might be followed by the user. 
The most strongly established rationality framework is based on the assumption of 
mazimization of a value function or an utility function. Under rather general assumptions, 
the complete preordering that represents the preferences of the decision maker can be 
represented by an utility function u :  Eg -1 R' or u :  E, -1 R' such that by maximizing 
this function over z E X ,  we can select the decision which is most preferable to  the deci- 
sion maker; the publications related to this framework are very numerous, but for a con- 
structive review see, for example, Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
There are many fundamental and technical difficulties related to the identification of 
such utility function. Leaving aside various technical difficulties, we should stress the fun- 
damental ones. Firstly, a continuous utility function exists if there is no strict hierarchy 
of values between decision outcomes, if all decision outcomes can be aggregated into one 
value - say, of monetary nature; this does not mean that hierarchically higher ethical con- 
siderations cannot be incorporated in this framework, but that they must be treated as 
constraints, cannot be evaluated in the decision process. Thus, the utility maximization 
framework represents the culture of an entrepreneur facing an infinite market which, 
although it represents the behavior of many human decision makers, is by no means the 
universal case of human rationality - see, for example, Rappoport (1984). Secondly, while 
the utility maximization framework might be a good predictor of mass economic 
phenomena, it has many  drawbacks as a predictor of individual behavior - see, for example, 
Fisher (1979), Erlandson (1981), Horsky and Rao (1984). According to the results of 
research presented in these papers, the utility function approach can be used in a rather 
simple, laboratory environment, but can fail in more complex situations. 
Thirdly - and most importantly for applications in decision support systems - an 
experimental identification and estimation of an utility function requires many questions 
and answers in the interaction with the decision maker. Users of decision support systems 
are typically not prepared to answer that many questions, for several reasons. They do 
not like to waste too much time and they do not like to disclose their preferences in too 
much detail because they intuitively perceive that the decision system should support 
them in learning about the decision situation and thus they should preserve the right to 
change their minds and preferences. Therefore, if any approximation of an utility function 
is used in a decision support system, it should be nonstationary in t ime in order to  
account for the learning and adaptive nature of making process. Such an approximation 
cannot be very detailed, it must have a reasonably simple form characterized by some 
adaptive parameters that can aggregate the effects of learning. 
Another rationality framework, called satisficing decision making, was formulated by 
Simon (1969) and further extended by many researchers, see for example Erlandson 
(1981) for a formalization and review of this approach. Originally, this approach assumed 
that human decision makers do not optimize, because of the difficulty of optimization 
operations, because of uncertainty of typical decision environment, and because of com- 
plexity of the decision situations in large organizations. Therefore, this approach was 
sometimes termed bounded rationality, that is, somewhat less than perfect rationality; 
however, there are many indications that this approach represents not bounded, but cul- 
turally different rationality. While the first two reasons for not optimizing have lost today 
their validity (both in the calculative sense, with the development of computer technology 
and optimization techniques, including issues of uncertainty, and in the deliberative sense 
- expert, decision makers can intuitively optimize in quite complex situations), the third 
reason remains valid and has been reinforced by the results of various studies. 
For example, the studies of human behavior in situation of social traps or games 
with paradoxical outcomes - see Rappoport (1974) - and of evolutionary development of 
behavioral rules that  resolve such social traps - see Axelrod (1985) - indicate that  evolu- 
tionary experience forces humans to  accept certain rules of ethical character that  stop 
maximizing behavior. Any intelligent man after some quarrels with his wife learns that 
maximization is not always the best norm of behavior; children learn from conflicts 
among themselves that  cooperative behavior is also individually advantageous for a longer 
perspective. All these observations and studies might motivate in the future the develop 
ment of a new framework of evolutionary rationality, but certainly reinforce the conclu- 
sions of the satisficing framework that  there are rational reasons to  stop maximizing in 
complex situations. I t  was also noted - see, for example, Galbraith (1967) - that  
satisficing behavior corresponds to  the culture of big industrial organizations. 
A very important contribution of the satisficing framework is the observation that 
decision makers often use aspiration levels for various outcomes of decisions; in classical 
interpretations of the satisficing framework, these aspiration levels indicate when to  stop 
optimizing. While more modern interpretations might prefer other rules for stopping 
optimization, the concept of aspiration levels is extremely useful for aggregating the 
results of learning by the decision maker: aspiration levels represent values of decision out- 
comes that can be accepted as reasonable or satisfactory by the decision maker and thus are 
aggregated, adaptable parameters that are suf ic ient  for a simple representation of his accu- 
mulated ezperience. 
There might be also other frameworks of rationality, such as the framework of goal- 
and program oriented planning, see Glushkov (1972), Pospelov and Irikov (1976), 
Wierzbicki (1985), that  corresponds to the culture of planning organizations. This frame- 
work has some similarities, but also some differences to  the utility maximization frame- 
work, the satisficing framework and to  the principle of reference point optimization 
developed by Wierzbicki (1980) in multiobjective optimization and decision support. 
In order first t o  include the principle of reference point optimization into the frame- 
work of satisficing decisions and then to  develop a broader framework that  would be use- 
ful for decision support for decision makers representing various perspectives of rational- 
ity, Wierzbicki (1982, 1984b, 1985, 1986) proposed the following principles of 
quasisatisficing decision making: 
A quasisatisficing decision situation consists of (one or several) decision makers or 
users that  might represent any perspective of rationality and have the right of changing 
their minds due to  learning and of stopping optimization for any reason (for example, in 
order to avoid social traps) as well as of a decision support system that  might be either 
fully computerized or include also human experts, analysts, advisors. It is assumed that: 
- The user evaluates possible decisions on the basis of a set (or vector) of attributes 
or objective outcomes. These factors can be expressed in numerical scale (quantitatively) 
or in verbal scale (qualitatively), like "bad", "good" or "excellent". Each factor can be 
additionally constrained by specifying special requirements on it that  must be satisfied. 
Beside this, objective outcomes can be characterized by their type: maximized, minim- 
ized, stabilized - that  is, kept close t o  a given level (which corresponds to  foregoing optim- 
ization), or floating - that  is, included for the purpose of additional information or for 
specifying constraints. The user has the control over the specification of objective out- 
comes together with their types and of possible aggregation of such factors. 
- One of the basic means of communication of the user with the decision support sys- 
tem is his specification of aspiration levels for each objective outcome; these aspiration 
levels are interpreted as reasonable values of objective outcomes. In more complex situa- 
tions, the user can specify two levels for each objective outcome - an aspiration level 
interpreted as above and a reservation level interpreted as the lowest acceptable level for 
the given objective outcome. 
- Given the information specified by the user - i.e., the specification of objective out- 
comes and their types, together with aspiration and possibly reservation levels - the deci- 
sion support system following the quasisatisficing principle should use this guiding infor- 
mation, together with other information contained in the system, in order to propose to 
the user one or several alternative decisions that are best attuned to this guiding informa- 
tion. When preparing (generating or selecting) such alternative decisions, the decision 
support system should not impose on the user the optimizing or the satisficing or any 
other behavior, but should follow the behavior that is indicated by the types of objective 
outcomes. This means that the decision support system should optimize when a t  least one 
objective outcome is specified as minimized or maximized and should satisfice (stop 
optimizing upon reaching aspiration levels) when all objective outcomes are specified as 
stabilized. The later case corresponds actually to the technique of goal programming, see 
e.g. Ignizio (1978), hence the quasisatisficing decision support can be also considered as a 
generalization of this technique. By using aspiration or reservation levels for some objec- 
tive outcomes as constraints, also the goal- and program oriented behavior can be sup- 
ported by a quasisatisficing decision support system. 
In order to illustrate possible responses of a quasisatisficing decision support system 
to the guiding information given by the user, let us assume that all specified objective 
outcomes are supposed to be maximized and have specified aspiration levels. We can dis- 
tinguish then the following cases: 
Case 1: the user has overestimated the possibilities implied by admissible decisions 
(since their constraints express available resources) and there is no admissible decision 
such that the values of all objective outcomes are exactly equal to their aspiration levels. 
In this case, however, it is possible to propose a decision for which the values of objective 
outcomes are as close as possible (while using some uniform scaling, for example implied 
by the aspiration and reservation levels) to their aspiration levels; the decision support 
system should tentatively propose a t  least one or several of such decisions to the user. 
Case 2: the user underestimated the possibilities implied by admissible decisions and 
there exist a decision which results in the values of objective outcomes exactly equal to 
the specified aspiration levels. In this case, it is possible to propose a decision which 
improves all objective outcomes uniformly as much as possible. The decision support sys- 
tem should inform the user about this case and tentatively propose a t  least one or several 
of such decisions. 
Case 3: the user, by a chance or as a result of a learning process, has specified aspira- 
tion levels there are uniquely attainable by an admissible decision. The decision support 
system should inform the user about this case and specify the details of the decision that 
results in the attainment of aspiration levels 
In the process of quasisatisficing decision support, all aspiration levels and the 
corresponding decisions proposed by the system have tentative character. If a decision 
proposed by the system is not satisfactory to the user, he can modify the aspiration levels 
and obtain new proposed decisions, or even modify the specification of objective outcomes 
or constraints; the process is repeated until the user learns enough to make the actual 
decision himself or to accept a decision proposed by the system. 
The process of quasisatisficing decision making can be formalized mathematically - 
see, e.g., Wierzbicki (1986) - and the mathematical formalization can be interpreted in 
various ways; let us consider an interpretation that corresponds to the framework of util- 
ity maximization. We assume that the user has a nonstationary utility function that 
changes in time due to his learning about a given decision situation. At each time instant, 
however, he can intuitively and tentatively (possibly with errors concerning various 
aspects of the decision situation) maximize his utility; let this tentative maximization 
determine his aspiration levels, denoted here by w E Eg.  
When he communicates the aspiration levels w to the decision support system, the 
system should use this information, together with the specification of the decision situa- 
tion, in order to  construct an approximation of his utility function that  is relatively sim- 
ple and easily adaptable to  the changes of aspiration levels, treated as parameters of this 
approximation. By maximizing such an approximative utility function while using more 
precise information about the attainability of alternative decisions and other aspects of 
the decision situation - for example, expressed by the substantive model of the decision 
situation incorporated by expert advice into the decision support system - a tentative 
decision can be proposed to  the user. 
Such a tentative approximation of the user's utility function, constructed in the deci- 
sion support system only in order t o  propose a tentative decision to  the learning decision 
maker, is called here order-consistent achievement function or simply achievement func- 
tion and has the form u(y) = s(y,w). It should be stressed that  the concept of achieve- 
ment function has been also used in the context of goal programming, but without the 
requirement of order consistency (achievement functions in goal programming are 
equivalent to  norms and thus satisfy the requirements of Cases 1 and 3 listed above but 
fail to  satisfy the requirements of Case 2). By an order consistent achievement function 
we understand here either an order representing or an order approximating achievement 
function, according to  the following definitions: 
An order representing achievement function is a continuous function 
s :  Yo x E, -+ R', with arguments y E Yo and w E E, interpreted as an attainable objec- 
tive outcome vector and an aspiration level vector, correspondingly, that  satisfies the fol- 
lowing requirements: 
a l .  I t  is strictly order preserving (monotone) with respect to y and the positive cone D 
implied by the partial preordering (according to the types of objective outcomes) specified 
by the decision maker, that  is, for all w E E,: 
Yz- Y l  E int D - ~ ( Y I ,  w) < s(y2, w) 
a2. It is order representing with respect to  y and the positive cone D, that  is, for all 
w E Ev: 
If E,=Rm and all objective outcomes are maximized, D=R+m, then a simple exam- 
ple of an order representing achievement function is: 
s(y,w) = min (yi - 
l< i_<m 
where a, represent some scaling units for subsequent objectives; because of these scaling 
units, this function has a cardinal form (does not depend on positive affine transforma- 
tions of the space of outcomes together with scaling units), but is not separable. 
An order-approximating achievement function is a continuous function 
s :  Yo x E, -+ R1, with arguments y E Yo and w E E, interpreted as an attainable objec- 
tive outcome vector and an aspiration level vector, correspondingly, that satisfies the fol- 
lowing requirements: 
bl. It is strongly order preserving (monotone) with respect to y and the positive cone D, 
that  is, for all w E E,: 
b2. It is order approximating with respect to  y and the positive cone D ,  that  is, for all 
w E E, and for some small e>O: 
where 
D, = {y E E,: dist(y, D) < c  I y 1) 
If E - Rm and D= R+"', then a simple example of an order approximating achieve- 
,: 
ment function is: 
Intuitively speaking, we might say that if w E Yo - D, then the maximization of s(y,w) 
over y E Yo represents a uniform maximization of all components of the surplus 
y - w E D; if w 6 E, - D, then the same maximization represents distance minimization 
between the sets w+ D and 
which is the set of generalized Pareto optimal objective outcomes in the sense implied 
by the positive cone D. 
Important properties of order consistent achievement functions are summarized by 
the following theorems, see Wierzbicki (1986) : 
Theorem 1. If s(y, w) is strongly order preserving (bl )  then its maximal points in y E Yo 
are generalized Pareto optimal, that is, satisfy the following condition: 
y " =  argmax s(y,  w) --4 Y o n  ( y " +  6) =C#J 
YE Yo 
where 
6 = D \ ( D n  -D) 
If s(y,  w) is strictly order preserving (al) then its maximal points in y E Yo are general- 
ized weakly Pareto optimal, that is, satisfy the following condition: 
y" = arg max s(y,  w) =+ Yo n (y" - intD) = t#~ 
I€ Y" 
Theorem 2. If s(y, w) is order approzimating (b2) and w E Yo is generalized properly 
Pareto optimal (with trade off coefficients bounded by c  and 1 / c  ) , then the maximum of 
~ ( y ,  w) in y E Yo, equal zero, is attained at y=w. If s(y, w) is order representing (a2) and 
w E Yo is generalized weakly Pareto optimal, then the maximum of s(y,  w) in y E Yo, 
equal zero, is attained at y=w. 
Thus, the usefulness of achievement functions in building interactive decision sup- 
port systems follows from the following properties: 
- maximization of an order approximating achievement function results in Pareto 
optimality, no matter whether the aspiration level is attainable or not; order representing 
functions are less useful, because their maxima are only weakly Pareto optimal (if, for 
example, some component of objective outcomes is supposed to be stabilized, then the 
implied positive cone D has empty interior and all attainable objective outcomes are 
weakly Pareto optimal with respect to this cone); 
- if a decision i E Xo and the corresponding objective outcome i E Yo maximize an 
order approximating achievement function and 2 = s ( i ,  w) = 0 then the aspiration levels 
w are attainable and Pareto optimal (properly, that is, with bounded trade off 
coefficients) ; 
- if, in the above situation, 2 < 0, then the aspiration levels w are not attainable, 
- if,  in the above situation, 2 > 0, then the aspiration levels w are attainable, but not 
Pareto optimal. 
Therefore, an order approximating achievement function can be used for computing 
Pareto optimal decisions as well as for checking for Pareto optimality and attainability of 
an arbitrarily given w E Eo. Moreover, the value of such achievement function can be 
meaningfully interpreted - it can be treated as a kind of qualitative distance between a 
given decision f or its objective outcome y^ and the aspiration level w .  
Beside the forms ( I ) ,  (2) of achievement functions, there are many other forms, see 
Wierzbicki (1986). Another example of an order representing achievement function might 
be: 
The above function is especially useful when applied to  decision support systems with 
substantive models of linear multiobjective optimization type, when its maximization can 
be reduced by suitable transformation of variables to  a single objective linear program- 
ming problem with additional constraints (see Lewandowski and Grauer, 1982, 1984). 
Practical experiments with this approach (see, for example, Lewandowski a t  all., 
1985, Dobrowolski and Zebrowski, 1987) have shown that the language of aspiration levels 
coincides very well with the style of thinking of practical decision makers. The informa- 
tion which is required from the user is easy to express, as opposed to other approaches 
based on pairwise comparisons, explicit weighting factors, estimation of other forms of 
utility functions, etc. 
Theoretically, the learning process of interaction with a quasisatisficing decision sup- 
port system via changing aspiration levels might be not sufficient for all decision makers: 
some of them might learn sufficiently to select their preferred decision, some others might 
still be puzzled and require some help in the convergence to  their best preferred decision. 
There several ways of organizing such support for the user in changing his aspiration lev- 
els that the corresponding maxima of achievement functions converge to  the maximum of 
his utility function. One way consists in the visual interactive approach of Korhonen and 
Laakso (1986), or directional scanning of aspirations and the corresponding maxima of 
achievement functions. Another approach proposed by Michalevich (1986) relies on quasi- 
gradient stochastic optimization and secures convergence even if we assume nonstationar- 
ity of user's utility function and stochastic mistakes of the user in specifying directions of 
change for aspirations; however, this approach is necessarily slow. Still another approach 
might consist in exploiting the ideas of the STEM procedure (see Larichev, 1979) and 
combining it with the maximization of an achievement function, but this approach would 
be also slow. Experience with applications of quasisatisficing principles in decision support 
systems shows that while most users welcome additional tools such as visual interactive 
approach, practically none of them require additional support in the convergence to their 
best preferred solution. 
3. ALTERNATIVE BASED AND ASPIRATION LED COMMITTEE DECI- 
SION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
We will further distinguish between various approaches to  DSS, for the purpose of 
this paper, according to the method of generating alternatives. Two opposite situations 
can occur: 
a. The set of alternatives is generated by a team of specialists (analysts, experts, 
other staff), on the basis of their knowledge about the decision problem being solved, pos- 
sibly by employing special procedures, but without explicitly taking into consideration 
and evaluating all possible quality factors, objectives and attributes. This set of alterna- 
tives is submitted to  the decision maker (or group of decision makers) for evaluation and 
selection. After performing the evaluation, some alternatives are rejected and possibly a 
new set is generated. Such a decision support system will be called alternative based. 
b. The decision support system contains an explicit substantive model of the decision 
situation, as defined in the previous section, constructed by a team of specialists 
(analysts, experts). While working with such a model, using for example the aspiration 
led quasisatisficing decision process, alternative decisions can be generated. Such decision 
support systems will be called model  based. 
Evidently, what differs in these approaches is the organization of the feedback loop 
between the decision maker and the mechani sm for generating alternatives.  Between these 
two opposite approaches, there might be many intermediate organizations of this feedback 
loop. 
For the quasisatisficing principles of decision support, both approaches have been 
implemented and tested. A family of quasisatisficing, model based decision support sys- 
tems, named DIDAS (Dynamic Interactive Decision Analysis and Support) has been 
developed and applied to many practical problems, see for example Lewandowski et al. 
(1987). An alternative based system, named SCDAS (Selection Committee Decision 
Analysis and Support) for supporting decision making in group environment has been 
recently developed, see Lewandowski et al. (1986) and will be described in the sequel. 
Many major decisions in management and engineering are delegated to committees 
or groups of decision makers. The institution of a committee - that averages diverse 
interests, combines various information sources in the face of uncertainty and provides for 
a forum of brain storming - remains an important element of many decision processes. It 
is therefore reasonable to develop decision support systems that will help to improve the 
process of committee decision making. 
The problem of selecting one alternative from a finite set of alternatives presented to 
a committee is one of the most basic and classical decision problems and has received 
much attention in the decision-theoretical literature (between more recent contributions 
we should mention here Mirkin, 1979, Kuzmin, 1982, Pankova et al. 1984). There are 
many variants of such a problem; here, we will consider the following formulation: 
A commi t t ee  consists of several members (denoted here by k = 1, ..., K); each member 
can have either equal or different voting power (denoted here by a voting power coefficient 
u ( k ) ) ,  specified a priori by the commi t t ee  charter. In addition to the committee structure, 
the committee charter might specify the purpose of the committee's work, further pro- 
cedural details, etc. 
The problem faced by the committee is to jointly rank or select one or a few from a 
set of available decision alternatives (these might be candidates for a job, proposals for 
R&D projects, alternative transportation routes, proposed sites of an industrial facility, 
alternative computer systems, etc.). The list of alternatives needs not be complete at the 
beginning of the committee's work; during the decision-making process, new alternatives 
may be generated and subsequently evaluated. 
Evaluation of alternatives is performed by the committee by first specifying decision 
attributes (such as the age, experience, professional reputation, etc., of a candidate) and 
then assessing each alternative with respect to each of these attributes. The list of deci- 
sion attributes (denoted by j = 1, ..., J) might be specified in the committee's charter or 
decided upon by the committee. In any case, decision attributes must be specified before 
alternatives can be evaluated and compared. 
Each alternative (denoted by i = 1, ..., I) must be evaluated by the committee or its 
individual members. The problem consists of proposing a decision process which together 
with an assessment of various attributes of alternatives and an aggregation of evaluations 
across both attributes and committee members, leads to a final ranking or selection of one 
or several alternatives in a way that is rational, understandable and acceptable to the 
committee members. 
Several approaches to this problem have been developed; most of them are based on 
the classical multi-attribute utility theory (see e.g. Keeney and Raiffa, 1976), but there 
are also alternative approaches, such as the analytical hierarchy of Saaty (1982), the ord- 
e r ing~ of Roy (1971) or aggregation principle by Jacquet-Lagreze (1982, 1984). Some of 
these approaches have been also implemented as microcomputer-based decision support 
systems: an interesting implementation is that of analytical hierarchy (EXPERT 
CHOICE, 1983) or the non-procedural package DEMOS (1982) used for probabilistic 
evaluation of alternatives. Another commercially available implementation (LIGH- 
TYEAR, 1984), based on utility theory and weighting coefficients specified by the user, 
employs a rather simple decision process and is restricted to only one user, hence it is not 
applicable in committee decisions. 
Most of these approaches rely on either user-supplied rankings of attributes and 
alternatives for each attribute, pairwise comparisons of alternatives, or some other com- 
parisons such as based on the uncertainty equivalence principle (that is, comparisons to a 
lottery). Such type of information is rather difficult to obtain during discussions with 
committee members. We describe here instead an aspiration led approach based on 
quasisatisficing decision principles and on the concept of achievement function. 
Beside an aspiration level which expresses a reasonable (or satisfactory) value for 
each attribute, members of the committee can specify a reservation level, which represents 
a minimum acceptable level for each attribute (e.g. investment cost should not exceed 
some given a priori value). If an alternative is evaluated below the reservation level on 
even one attribute, it is considered unacceptable; if it is evaluated at least equal to aspira- 
tion levels for all attributes, it is considered highly desirable. The extension of an aspira- 
tion led quasisatisficing decision process to alternative based committee decision making 
was first proposed by Johnson (1984); details of the procedure, theoretical background 
and principles of implementation were also presented in the paper by Lewandowski et al. 
(1986). 
3.1 Procedural Framework 
One of the basic features of the presented method is a structuralization of the deci- 
sion process: it is assumed that the process consists of several well defined stages. Accord- 
ing to this procedure, it is possible to advance the decision process forward only if all 
committee members successfully completed all previous stages. Details of the procedure 
must be defined during the initial stage of the decision process. Let us consider in detail 
all stages of this decision making process. 
The first stage or point on the agenda is to  define the procedures by which the com- 
mittee will operate. The questions addressed here should include the following: 
(a) What is the expected product of the committee work and how does it influence 
the selection of the details of the procedure? The answer to  this question depends on the 
committee's charter and its perceived role. For example, if the expected product is a short 
list of significantly different alternatives, procedural rules will be different from the case 
when the expected product is a consensus opinion on one, "best" alternative. 
(b) What rules for aggregating opinions across the committee should be adopted, in 
particular, should outlying opinions be included in or excluded from aggregation? 
(c) Should the committee be allowed to divide and form coalitions that might 
present separate assessments of aspirations, attribute scores and thus final rankings of 
alternatives? 
The second objective of the first stage is problem specification. Neither the list of 
alternatives, nor their descriptions need be complete a t  this stage; moreover, this informa- 
tion might be not known to the committee members at this stage, if they wish to avoid 
the bias in specifying attributes and their aspiration levels. The important issue a t  this 
stage that  requires discussion and specification by the entire committee is the definition of 
the attributes of the decision and their scales of assessment. 
Various studies in decision theory suggest that  a reasonable number of attributes 
should not exceed seven to  nine (see e.g. Dinkelbach, 1982); if more attributes are sug- 
gested, they should be aggregated. For example, there might be a large number of qualita- 
tive indicators that  are all related to the ecological impacts of the planned investments; 
instead of using all these indicators, it is better to  ask committee members to  evaluate 
subjectively the attribute "ecology", that  is, to  translate the information about all these 
indicators into one assessment. Such an assessment might be given originally on a verbal 
scale from "unacceptable" to  "excellent", and later transformed into a quantitative scale, 
say from 0 to  10. Another possible option is to  introduce a hierarchy in the set of objec- 
tives, which, however, makes the procedure more complicated. 
During the second stage of the the decision process, aspiration and/or reservation 
levels for all attributes are determined separately by each committee member. After these 
values are entered into the decision support system, all necessary indicators (disagreement 
indicators, dominant weighting factors - see further comments) can be computed. 
The third stage has again two objectives. One is the analysis and discussion of aspira- 
tions by the entire committee. These discussions are supported by the computed indica- 
tors and their graphic interpretations. In these discussions, the committee might address 
the following questions: 
(a) Do the computed indicators accurately reflect the perceptions of individual com- 
mittee members about the relative importance of various attributes (if not, should the 
aspirations or reservations be corrected)? 
(b) What are the relevant differences of opinions between committee members and 
do they represent an essential disagreement about decision principles? 
(c) Does the entire committee agree to use joint, aggregated aspirations (reserva- 
tions), or will there be several separate sub-group aggregations? 
The second objective of the third stage is a survey of alternatives. Discussions might 
center on the following issues: 
(a) Are the available descriptions of alternatives adequate for judging them accord- 
ing to  the accepted list of attributes? If the answer is negative, additional information 
should be gathered by sending out questionnaires, consulting experts etc. 
(b) Which of the available alternatives are irrelevant and should be deleted from the 
list? Such preliminary screening can be done in various ways. The committee might define 
some screening attributes and reservation levels for them (of a quantitative or simple logi- 
cal structure): for example, we do not accept investments which are more expensive than 
a given limit. 
The fourth stage of the decision process is the individual assessment of alternatives. 
The evaluation of each attribute for each alternative is the main input of committee 
members into the system. Each member specifies evaluation scores; the decision support 
system helps him by displaying the evaluations already made and those still t o  be 
entered. 
When all evaluations are entered, a committee member should proceed to  the indivi- 
dual analysis of alternatives, based on calculations of an achievement function that  leads 
to  a ranking of all alternatives for the given committee member. This ranking is the main 
source of learning about the distribution of alternatives relative to  aspirations. 
The questions addressed by each member a t  this point might be as follows: 
(a) Do the rankings along each attribute correctly represent the individual's evalua- 
tions of alternatives; does the achievement ranking, based on individual aspirations, 
correctly represent the aggregate evaluation (if not, should the scores be modified)? 
(c) If the committee member agrees with the individual achievement ranking pro- 
posed by the system, what are the differences between this ranking and that  based on 
individual scores but related to  committee aggregated aspirations? Are these differences 
significant, or can he accept them as the result of agreement on joint decision principles? 
The  fijth stage of the decision process relates to  an aggregation of evaluations and 
rankings across the committee and consists of a discussion of essential differences in 
evaluations, followed by a discussion of disagreements about a preliminary ranking of 
alternatives aggregated across the committee. These discussions are supported by the 
system; the system computes indicators of differences of opinion and prepares a prelim- 
inary aggregated ranking. 
The questions addressed by the committee a t  this point might be the following: 
(a) On which attributes and alternatives the largest differences in evaluations 
between committee members are observed? Do these disagreements represent essential 
differences in information about the same alternative? 
(b) What is the essential information (or uncertainty about such information) that  
causes such disagreements? Should additional information be gathered, or can certain 
committee members supply this information? 
(c) Would the results of these discussions and possible changes of evaluations 
influence the preliminary aggregated ranking list proposed by the system? This can be 
tested by applying simple sensitivity analysis tools. 
(d) Does the preliminary ranking proposed by the system correctly represent pre- 
valent commit tee preferences? 
After these discussions, a return to  any previous stage of the process is possible. If 
the committee decides that  the decision problem has been sufficiently clarified, it can 
proceed conclude the fifth stage by the final agreement on the aggregated ranking or selec- 
tion of one or more alternatives. It is important to  stress again that  the committee needs 
not stick to  the ranking proposed by the system, since the purpose of this ranking - as 
well as of all information presented by the decision support system - is to  clarify the deci- 
sion situation rather than t o  prescribe the action that  should be taken by the committee. 
3.2 F o r m a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  Decis ion P r o c e s s  
In the previous section we presented the general structure of the decision process. 
The decision support system supervises the progress of the discussion within the commit- 
tee - its role is to  process all the information necessary to  perform the discussion, compute 
all necessary informative indicators, display graphic information and ensure proper struc- 
turalization of the process. In the sequel, we will consider in more detail the functions of 
the decision support system during each stage of the decision process. 
3.2.1 S e t t i n g  and discuss ing asp i ra t ions  
Most judgmental decision processes require a choice of scales of evaluation for each 
decision attribute. The scales are often qualitative, such as unacceptable, bad, acceptable, 
good, very good, excellent, though they can be transformed into quantitative scales for 
computational purposes. When asked to  specify aspiration and reservation levels on these 
scales a t  an early stage of the decision process, the decision maker is better prepared t o  
make consistent evaluations across alternatives. However, we cannot expect and we 
should not require full consistency in any judgmental decision process, since not all 
relevant attributes might be evaluated and the relevant information about alternatives is 
never completely shared by all committee members. If each committee member is asked 
independently to specify his aspiration and (or) reservation levels for each attribute, a 
comparison of such results across the committee and across attributes serves several pur- 
poses: 
(a) the relative importance of each attribute for each committee member and across 
the committee, as implied by the more or less attainable levels of aspirations, becomes 
more apparent, as discussed below. 
(b) the division of opinions among the committee members can be discussed: if a 
significant subset of the committee has high aspirations (reservations) for an attribute 
and another subset has low aspirations (reservations), it is a case of a clear disagreement 
on decision principles. The committee might then discuss this disagreement and come to a 
consensus; or agree to disagree by allowing the formation of coalitions that rally for the 
importance of various attributes (for example, when deciding on siting an industrial facil- 
ity, a part of the committee might be more concerned with environmental impacts, 
another more concerned with economic impacts). 
(c) if the discussion shows that the reason for disagreement stems from different per- 
ceptions by various committee members about the exact meaning of a particular attribute 
and its scale of evaluation, the result might be a better specification of, or at  least correc- 
tions in, the list of attributes. 
(d) if the committee (or a coalition inside the committee) agrees to use averaged 
aspiration and (or) reservation levels, each committee member has a better perception of 
the anchor points to be used when evaluating alternatives. 
In order to support these discussions, a number of indicators can be computed. 
Denote the individually specified aspiration levels for attribute j by the committee 
member k by p(j,k) and the corresponding reservation levels by r(j ,k).  Then the commit- 
tee "voting" procedure might specify an averaging of individual inputs, weighted by the 
voting power coefficients v(k) as follows: 
Such an average is subject to manipulations by committee members who have an 
incentive to distort their true aspirations in order to influence the entire committee. A 
classical remedy, successfully used in subjective evaluations of certain sport performances 
(e.g. ice skating or ski jumping) is to exclude outlying opinions, in this case deleting the 
highest and the lowest p(j ,k) or r(j ,k) across all k before aggregating. This procedural 
option motivates committee members to state their preferences carefully since they will 
have no impact if they voice the outlying opinions. If the committee adopts this option 
(or if it is imposed by the committee charter), then an aggregation of opinions can be 
characterized by: 
where 
denote the committee members with outlying aspiration levels who are therefore excluded 
from the averaging. The calculations are similar for aggregation of reservation levels r ( j )  
with corresponding E(r,j) and _k(r,j). Evidently, computing the average is the only one of 
possible approaches to aggregating individual aspirations. Another approach was sug- 
gested by Mirkin (1979) who proposed computing the median as a good aggregation prin- 
ciple. The basic advantage of median is its robustness - the median is naturally insensitive 
on data outliers. This approach, however, has been not tested yet. 
3.2.2 Assessing disagreement 
The disagreement about aspiration (reservation) levels for an attribute among the 
committee can be measured in various ways. Clustering algorithms can be used in the 
case of very large numbers of committee members to identify the positional structure of 
the committee. Or, one could evaluate various statistical moments of the distributions of 
p(j,k) and r(j,k) across k, although moments of a distribution do not typically indicate 
the configuration of dissent. A good indicator of disagreement should distinguish between 
the case when there are two or more sizable dissenting groups of committee members, 
each representing a uniform opinion, and the case when the differences of opinion are dis- 
tributed uniformly or at tributed mainly to outlying opinions. To identify these 
differences, a disagreement indicator can be defined in the following way. 
First let us consider the absolute change of aspirations: 
where committee members are renumbered such that 
Now AP(j ,k)  can be split into the distribution of individual changes of opinion: 
In these equations, k can be interpreted as the index of the pairwise comparison between 
two ranked committee members. If large differences occur only at  the ends of the range of 
k ,  corresponding to outlying opinions or small minority groups, they are not as significant 
as when they occur in the middle of the range. To correct for this, we introduce a 
coefficient c(k).- for example, in the form: 
Other formulae can also be used for this coefficient; the above has been selected after 
empirical tests. The maximum value of c(k) for any (K,k) is one. Also, for all K, c(k) = 0 
for both k = 1 and k=K-1 since outlying opinions are not counted in the aggregation. It 
is useful to define the disagreement indicator as: 
This disagreement indicator is bounded by the absolute difference of aspirations, 
AP( j ,K) ;  but DI(p,j)=AP(j,K) only if the committee is split into two equal fractions of 
equal aspirations in each fraction. Note that the disagreement indicator (5) has a peculiar 
property: it is always equal to zero if K 5 3. Clearly this is because a committee of three 
always has two outlying opinions and only one will therefore be counted in the aggrega- 
tion. 
Similarly, disagreement indicators DI(r,j) for the distribution of reservation levels 
Ar( j ,k)  can be computed. If both aspiration and reservation levels are used, the commit- 
tee might be interested in disagreement indicators for averages, DI(pr,j), computed for 
the distribution of pr(j,k), defined as: 
It should be stressed that  the above indicators serve only to  draw the attention of 
the committee to  the attributes and aspirations that  cause dissent, for which a discussion 
of differences of opinion might be useful. Similar disagreement indicators can be used 
when comparing the differences between individual assessments of specific alternatives. 
Another type of indicator relates t o  the relative importance of various attributes as 
implied by specified aspirations (reservations). Various types of indicators can also be 
used here. We choose dominant weighting factors implied by aspirations as relevant indica- 
tors because they are consistent with the function used later for the evaluation of alterna- 
tives. 
T o  be consistent with our theoretical decision model, the weighting factors for attri- 
butes are constructed as follows: If a committee member specifies aspirations for one attri- 
bute that  are "closer" to  the upper end of its evaluation scale than for another attribute, 
then this implies that  the former attribute is more important to  him than the latter one. 
More specifically, an indicator should be inversely proportional to  such a distance and, if 
the indicators are interpreted as weighting coefficients, they should be normalized so that  
they sum up to  one across all attributes. T o  avoid computational errors, the indicators 
should be calculable even in such an unreasonable case that  a committee member specifies 
aspirations equal t o  the upper end of the scale. Hence, we extend the upper bound 
slightly, denoting it by ub(j), and for simplicity normalize all scales so that  the lower 
bounds of the scales of all attributes are zero. Then the dominant weighting factors 
implied by aspiration levels p of attributes j for committee member k are computed as 
follows: 
Weighting factors implied by stated reservation levels w(r,j,k) are calculated similarly. 
These weighting factors can also be calculated for the preferences aggregated across 
the committee. In all cases, the indicators serve only as feedback signals to  individuals or 
to  the committee to  check whether their aspirations correctly reflect their perception of 
the relative importance of various attributes. Any observed inconsistencies can be easily 
corrected. 
3.2.3 Evaluating alternatives by individual committee members 
An essential part of the decision process is an individual assessment and analysis of 
all alternatives by each committee member. In the approach followed in this paper, i t  is 
assumed that  the assessment is performed not by rankings or pairwise comparisons but 
simply by assigning evaluation scores for each attribute to  each alternative (as a teacher 
would assign grades for each subject of learning t o  each pupil). Uncertainty in each assess- 
ment could be expressed by supplying a range of scores or a probability distribution for 
the scores; however, we consider here only the simpler case without individual uncertainty 
of evaluations. The scores of the k-th committee member for the j-th attribute of the i-th 
alternative are denoted here by q(i, j ,k). 
In order for each committee member to  see what the scores imply and check for any 
scoring errors, rankings of alternatives by various attributes can be produced in the sys- 
tem by listing the alternatives, starting with the best score on a given attribute and end- 
ing with the worst score. However, the committee member is also interested in an aggre- 
gate ranking which takes into account scores on all attributes to  test whether his intuitive 
opinion about which alternatives are best is consistent with the results of the scoring 
procedure. 
A special approximation of a utility function implied by aspiration levels is applied 
in order to  produce such an aggregate ranking; this approximation is called an  (order- 
consistent) achievement function. 
Consider the following question (Wierzbicki, 1986). Suppose the user knows the 
upper and lower bounds of an assessment scale and has specified a reservation and an 
aspiration level for each decision attribute; these four points we denote respectively by 
Wj) ,  ub( j ) ,  r ( j )  and ~ ( i ) ,  where 
Suppose a satisfaction (utility) value of zero is assigned to  an alternative whose attribute 
assignments are all equal to reservation levels, and a satisfaction (utility) value of one to 
an alternative whose attributes are all equal to  aspiration levels. We assume further that  
alternatives which have scores satisfying all their reservation levels are preferred to  any 
alternative which has a t  least one score not satisfying the corresponding reservation level. 
And similarly, alternatives which have scores satisfying all their aspiration levels are pre- 
ferred to  any alternative which has a t  least one score not satisfying the corresponding 
aspiration level. Finally, let an (unlikely) alternative with scores all equal to the lower 
bounds of the scales have the value of - b  (a  negative number) and an (unlikely) alterna- 
tive with scores all equal to  the upper bounds have the value of 1 + a (a number greater 
than one). What is the simplest cardinal utility function (i.e. a function that  is indepen- 
dent of all linear transformations of the assessment scales) that  is consistent with all of 
these assumptions? 
The simplest function that  meets these requirements can be constructed by using 
linear approximations between the points for which its values are known (-b, 
0, 1 and 1 + a ) .  Such a function, called also an order-representing achievement function, 
has the following form: 
where 
and q(i,k) = (q( i , l  ,k) ,.. . ,q(i,j ,k) ,... ,q(i,  J ,k))  is the vector of scores given by the k-th com- 
mittee member to the i-th alternative. Thus the achievement function maps a vector of 
attributes into a scalar value for each alternative. Additionally, p = ( p ( l ) ,  ...,p(j) ,...,p( J)) 
and r = ( r ( l ) ,  ..., r ( j )  ,..., r ( J ) )  are vectors of aspiration and reservation levels aggregated 
across the committee in a way that  is acceptable to all members. In its middle range, the 
function (10) can also be interpreted as a distance from reservation level scaled by the 
difference between aspiration and reservation levels for each attribute. 
However, the above achievement function has some disadvantages. Suppose the 
scales of assessments for all attributes are from 0 to 10, and the reservation levels are all 3 
while the aspiration levels are all 7. Compare two alternatives: one with all scores equal 
to  5 so that  the value of the achievement function (10) equals 0.5, while the second alter- 
native has scores of 7 for all attributes but one, which has the score 4 so that  
s (q ,p , r )  = 0.25. But the second alternative might be considered better: the better achieve- 
ments on many attributes could compensate for a worse achievement on one attribute. In 
order t o  correct for this consideration, we propose a modified form of the function ( lo ) ,  
that  is an order-approximating achievement function: 
where uj (q( i , j ,k) ,p( j ) , r ( j ) )  are defined as in (11). The parameter 6 in this function 
represents the intensity of correction of the worst (under-)achievement by the average 
(over-)achievement. In the example considered above, if 6 = 1 and there are 5 attributes, 
then the first alternative has a value of the achievement function (10) equal to  0.5 (due to  
the subdivision by 1 + c in ( lo) ,  this does not depend on 6 if all u j  are equal) but the 
second alternative has the corresponding value of 0.55. Hence the second alternative is 
preferred. If, however, c = 0.5, then the first alternative has an achievement value equal 
to  0.5 but the second alternative has an achievement value of 0.45, hence the first alterna- 
tive is now preferred. 
The choice of the parameter 6 is left to  the committee: if its members feel that the 
worst achievement matters most, they should choose slight correction (say, c = 0.1); if 
they feel that  the average achievement matters most, they should choose very strong 
correction (say, c = 2),  indicating that average achievement is twice as important as 
worst achievement. A good interpretability of the values of the achievement function 
(10) by the users is obtained if a=b=l and the values of s(q(i,k),p,r) are multiplied by 
10. Then the achievement range is from -10 (corresponding to  all scores equal to 0) 
through 0 (all scores on reservation levels), through 10 (all scores on aspiration levels) to  
20 (all scores maximal, equal to  10). 
We should also mention here some mathematical interpretations of the dominant 
weighting factors implied by aspiration or reservation levels in connection with achieve- 
ment functions in the forms (8) and (10). These achievement functions are nonlinear, 
hence their derivatives (corresponding to  the classical concept of a weighting factor in a 
linear utility function) depend on q(i,k). In fact, these achievement functions are 
nondifferentiable, hence they do not possess derivatives in the classical sense a t  some 
points - and, in particular, a t  the anchor points, that is, if q(i,k) = r or q(i,k) = p. The 
dominant weighting factors indicate directions in the J-dimensional space of the assess- 
ment vectors q(i,k), on which the points of nondifferentiability are located ; they are also 
representatives of so called subdifferentials of these functions a t  such points. While these 
properties of the dominant weighting factors are important mathematically, the reader 
should remember two points: the dominant weighting factors are not specified a priori or 
supplied explicitly, rather they are implied by the choice of aspiration and/or reservation 
levels for various attributes; on the other hand, they indicate the relative importance of 
various attributes as implied by aspiration and/or reservation levels. 
The achievement function (10) is used to aggregate scores given by a committee 
member to  various attributes of an alternative and then to rank various alternatives 
according to  their achievement values. This can be done when using either individual 
aspirations (reservations) of a committee member or aggregated aspirations (reserva- 
tions). In the former case, the ranking proposed by the system serves as a feedback to the 
committee member: he should compare it with his intuitive perception of ranking of alter- 
natives. If the ranking does not match his intuitive perception, he or she should check 
whether he did not make any errors in scoring; another reason for such mismatch might 
be his disagreement with the correction coefficient c adopted by the committee. If the 
ranking does match his intuitive perception, he or she should be prepared to accept the 
fact that  the ranking based on aggregated aspirations (reservations) might be different; 
but the committee member cannot protest if he or she accepts the right of the committee 
to  impose aggregated decision principles on the collective group. 
3.2.4 Aggregating individual assessments across the committee 
There are various interpretations of the process of aggregating preferences across a 
group of decision makers. Typically, the interpretation is related to  the concept of fair- 
ness; however, various paradoxes in decision theory (Saari, 1982) show that  there is no 
absolute meaning in this concept. In this paper, we simply require that  the committee 
specify a set of procedures that  is accepted as fair by the group. For example, if the char- 
ter of the committee specifies the voting power of each member, the procedurally "fair" 
aggregation is to  take the weighted average of evaluations. The members with greater 
voting power are supposedly either more responsible (consider, say, the role of the chair- 
man of the committee), more concerned with the outcome of the decision process, or more 
knowledgeable in a certain substantive area. 
Hence, a final ranking of alternatives for the entire committee can be proposed by 
the decision support system by computing the (weighted) averaged achievement values 
for each alternative: 
with s(q(i,k),p,r) defined as in (10) or (12). 
This aggregation procedure gives reliable results under certain assumptions, of which 
two are most important. First, we assume that  committee members do not bias their 
opinions in order to  manipulate the outcome of the decision process. In order to 
discourage such manipulations, it is advisable to exclude outlying opinions from the 
averaging process, as was done in (2) for the aggregation of aspiration levels: 
where 
k(i) = ar min s(q(i,k),p,r) 
- l g k l ~  (14b) 
F(i) = ar max s(q(i,k),p,r) 
I ! ~ < K  
Second, we assume that  committee members possess the same information about 
alternatives. This very demanding assumption is never fully satisfied in practice. The 
decision process encourages discussion and exchange of information about alternatives 
between committee members in part by including concise descriptions of alternatives and 
requiring agreement a t  certain stages. When disagreement is indicated by major 
differences in individual rankings of alternatives or by large values of the disagreement 
indicators, this should tell the committee to  stop and search for sources of disagreement. 
If the disagreement is due to  a difference in the information base between individuals, 
then the problem can be resolved by sharing and exchanging information. A graphic 
representation of the diverging scores for an attribute of an alternative helps greatly in 
such discussions; a committee member with a dissenting opinion can either convince the 
committee that  he or she has specific valuable information to  share, or be convinced that  
his opinion cannot be substantiated. This serves as an additional disincentive for attempt- 
ing to  manipulate the outcome of the decision process by biasing assessments. The 
interested reader should also consult Tversky et al. (1983) for discussions about biases in 
decision-making . 
After such discussion, the committee can either decide to  return to some earlier 
stage of the decision process (for example, to  correct the evaluation scores) or conclude 
the process. When adopting the final decision (a  ranking or a selection of alternatives) the 
committee is by no means constrained by the aggregate ranking proposed by the decision 
support system, but merely guided by the results. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE ORIENTED GROUP DECI- 
SION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
The framework presented in previous sections constituted the basis for an implemen- 
tation of an experimental version of decision support system for committee decision mak- 
ing. The availability of inexpensive personal computers with strong graphic capabilities 
and with network interfaces made it possible to apply modern computer technology for 
the development of easy to  use, user friendly and effective prototype system. It is neces- 
sary to mention that implementation of the decision support system is rather not a trivial 
task. The basic difficulty relates to  the fact, that the decision maker is not a computer 
specialist and usually is not familiar with the theory which is behind of the system. 
Therefore, even the best methodological concept will be rejected by the decision maker, if 
the usage of the system requires too much specific knowledge, is not robust or too compli- 
cated. Several comments relating to  the problem of user friendliness can be found in a 
paper by Lewandowski (1985) and in the book by Sprague and Carlson (1982). 
Other problems arise in the case of implementation of group decision support sys- 
tems. This is mostly connected with the communication aspects of such systems as well as 
is caused by large variety of possible communication and information exchange procedures 
(or protocols) which should be taken into consideration. These aspects have been studied 
extensively by Bui and Jarke (1986), Jarke (1986) and Jelassi (1987). The materialization 
of these concepts are the Co-oP system (Bui, 1986) and the Mediator (Jarke, 1985). There 
are several other group decision support systems described in the literature (see, for exam- 
ple, Gray, 1986) but there is not too much information published relating to  their design 
principles and details of implementation. 
Rather detailed classification of possible group communication situations have been 
proposed by Bui (1986) and Jarke (1986). They propose the four characterizing the deci- 
sion environment: 
- Spatial distance. This factor relates to the organization of the decision making pro- 
cess with respect to  the physical location of the participants - especially, whether full 
face-to-face communication between them can take place, and such a way of com- 
munication augments the features offered by the Decision Support System, 
- Temporal distance. This factor relates to the t ime synchronization of the decision 
process - whether decision makers are submitting their responses the same time, dur- 
ing the meeting, or in different points in time, 
- Commonality of goals. This factor describes the "decision making environment" - 
whether the group wants to solve the problem cooperatively, or there are the con- 
tradictory interests and the whole decision process is more oriented to conflict reso- 
lution and bargaging, 
- Structure of the process ("Control"). This factor distinguishes the situation where 
all group memebrs share equal rights and the decision making procedure is super- 
vised by the system, against the situation where one of the committee members has 
special rights and can be considered as the Committee President or the Mediator. 
Beside of the computer oriented aspects of the system design, the most important are 
however the methodological and procedural assumptions relating to the designed system. 
The mentioned above Mediator and Co-oP systems, being software products 
designed in consistent way, are newertheless lacking such a uniform "decision scientific" 
methodological bacground. Both leave the decision about the method used to  the disposal 
of the decision maker; moreover they support methods differing essentially in their 
assumptions and methodology, like ELECTRE and Saaty's analytical hierarchy approach. 
If different methods are being used by committee members, there is no reasonable way for 
a consistent comparison of the results or for. aggregating the results of individual evalua- 
tion. 
The basic design assumptions of the aspiration oriented group decision support sys- 
tem (SCDAS) are as follows: 
- The system should be implemented on the IBM (or IBM compatible) personal com- 
puters, connected through a network. If the network is not available, the system should 
run on a single computer, 
- The decision process is initiated by the committee president; he is treated by the 
system as a super-user which has privileged access to information which can be hidden to 
other committee members. He is the only person, who can change the problem definition - 
list of attributes, alternatives and committee members. He also decides about the pro- 
cedure, especially about a possible recourse in decision process, 
- The committee member has full freedom to analyze and change his data during 
each current stage, as well as to have a read-only access to data specified by other 
members, according to the procedure defined by the committee president. 
- The progress of the decision making process is performed by the supervisory pro- 
gram, which in particular, does not allow to change the data defined during previous 
stages, and ensures the proper advancement of the decision process, 
- The system is equipped with an electronic mail, which can be used for distributing 
commonly available information (e.q. detailed information about alternatives) and for 
communication between the committee president and the committee members. 
Summarizing, according to the mentioned above characteristic factors, the imple- 
mented version of the system can support the face-to-face as well as remote meetings 
(depending on the available hardware), the committee members can submit their deci- 
sions a t  different points of time, the decision process has hierarchical structure and is 
cooperative in its nature. 
The existing (see Lewandowski, 1987) implementation is mostly experimental and 
does not completelly fulfill all of the specified above design assumptions. It was however 
successfully used for solving practical problems - the results of these experiments have 
validated the design principles and have proven the usfulness of the existing implementa- 
tion (Dobrowolski and Zebrowski, 1987). 
5. EXTENSIONS OF THE SCDAS METHODOLOFY AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
The area of group decision support system is a relatively new one. There are several 
open questions, relating to the theory, the methodology as well as to the methods of 
efficient implementation. Some of the possible open questions and their sources have been 
discussed by Jarke (1986). According to our understanding of the problem, such questions 
can be splited into the following groups: 
Methodological problems. 
a. Rather frequently the alternatives are not independent. If for example, the com- 
mittee decides that a road from A to B is not necessary, probably there is no reason to 
build a road from B to C. Therefore, some logical relationships between alternatives can 
exist and must be taken into consideration in the decision process. 
6 .  The attributes (goals, objectives) have usually a hierarchical structure that can be 
reflected in the organization of the committee. Usually, the committee can be divided into 
subgroups, responsible for separate aspects of the project. Therefore, an attribute aggrega- 
tion procedure must be developed following, for example, the lines presented in Vlacic e t  
al. (1986). 
c. The value and quality of the information available to  the committee members as 
well as the information generated by the committee members must be taken into account 
during the decision making process. Frequently, the initial information is not complete 
and, even more frequently, a committee member might be not able to  give a precise 
answer concerning either his aspitations or the quality of a given alternative. It is impor- 
tant  to  consider such sources of uncertainty in the analysis in order to  evaluate the overall 
uncertainty of the final result. Therefore, sensitivity analysis should be performed on every 
step of the procedure, what in the case of alternative selection problem can create certain 
conceptual and computational difficulties. 
d. The role of the model in the alternative oriented group decision support systems 
must be investigated more deeply. In particular, model can be used on the stage of evalua- 
tion of alternatives as well as can be used as the tool for generating alternatives. 
Problems of interaction principles. 
An other group of problems relates to  the human interaction with the system. 
Although the problem is very general, we will mention here some more important issues 
related t o  the subject of organizing the dialogue and cooperation with the user: 
a. The principles of man-machine communication, in the broad understanding of this 
term - relate mainly t o  the development of a conceptual language for describing the prob- 
lem and the results. This is especially important in the case of group decision support 
systems, where all the committee members participating in the decision process should 
have the same understanding of the goals, procedural details and the interpretation and 
meaning of every component of the language used during the process (for example, if the 
attributes are measured in a numerical scale, it should be clear t o  everybody how to  inter- 
pret the values on this scale). Therefore, an additional phase in SCDAS procedural 
framework, preceeding the cottent initial phase would be necessary. 
b. The role of the user during design phase, and consequently, the jlezibility of the 
sys tem design which would allow participation in the design process by the user. This is a 
very important issue and a much attention has been paid recently to  this problem. 
According to  O'Mahony (1987): " . . . i n  general, the sys tem development process involves 
several distinct activities starting with the formulation of business strategy and ending with 
the implementation ... System users must participate in the entire process. Otherwise, the 
result may be a sys tem that is  technically ezcellent, but that fails to fit the business or the 
users...". The other aspects of the user particitation in the design or modification process 
is the "end-user programming syndromme" discussed in detail by Seybold (1987); several 
other approaches t o  this problem have been investigated by Martin (1982). 
c.  Another aspect relates to  the information processing abilities of the user. This 
influences strongly the possible tools and approaches to  information presentation, infor- 
mation analysis and possible approaches to  information exchange between the system and 
the user. Various ways of graphical information presentation and information aggregation 
should be developed and implemented in the system (for the review of some existing 
approaches, see Lansdown, 1982). The other important part of the system is a tutoring 
and ezplanatory module; the importance of such a module in decision support systems has 
been pointed out by Jelassi (1986). Several approaches for implementation of such a 
module, utilizing the artificial intelligence and expert systems concepts (although these 
concepts were developed in different areas of computer applications) have been already 
proposed, see, for example, Mason, 1986. 
Problems of computer engeneering. 
The last group of open problems relates to  computer engineering aspects of imple- 
mentation of group decision support systems. The most important points are as follows: 
a. The general sys tem architecture. It must be decided how to split functions of the 
system between the components of a computer network. If we consider a typical structure 
of the computer cluster - the server and the client computers, it is necessary to decide, 
what functions should be implemented on what machine. Moreover, the existing software 
- like databases, electronic mail and teleconferencing systems, document exchange systems 
must be taken into account and the designed decision support system must be correctly 
and efficiently interfaced to these components, 
b .  Reliability, flexibility and user friendliness. It is also necessary to decide, how to 
provide necessary level of reliability, flexibility and user friendliness of the system as the 
software product - especially in the context of all mentioned above problems and design 
requirements. 
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